Desventuras de un porteño en la Argentina

Miren lo que este porteño ignorante acaba de descubrir, desencanto que mis coprovincianos deberían compartir si ampliaran la frontera de lo político/económico mas allá de la General Paz e incluso mas allá del conurbano.

Este porteño-economisto-centrico descubre, gracias a este paper de Tommasi sobre el federalismo en la Argentina, que la papa de las desiciones políticas/económicas de su país no se formulan ni por ni para los bonaerenses/porteños, o incluso los metropolitanos, desde y hacia la "plaza de mayo", como el imaginario popular Clarín/La Nación inducido puede llegar a creer.

Permítanme presentar algunos extractos del trabajo (perdón por el ingles). Amigos que saben de política...1) HELP!! 2) ¿Porqué no me lo dijeron antes?

The bulk of the Argentine economy is concentrated in a few districts: the city and the province of Buenos Aires, plus the provinces of Santa Fe, Cordoba, and Mendoza concentrate almost 80% of economic activity and 70% of the population. The saliency of these areas, plus some salient aspects of Argentine history (military dictatorships, the visible ties of Peronism to the urban labor movement) have lead many observers to the mistaken impression that “the action” in Argentine politics takes place in “Plaza de Mayo”.

Non-metropolitan provinces have an institutional representation that far exceeds their population. In the period of market-oriented reforms, the peripheral regions held 40 out of 48 seats in the Senate (83% of the total). The degree of overrepresentation in the Upper House of Argentina is perhaps the worst in federations across the world. Stepan (1999) utilizes three indicators of malapportionment across twelve modern federal democracies, and in all the indicators Argentina is the worst case

This over-representation is not limited to the Senate. In the Chamber of Deputies the peripheral region held 52% of the seats. While the original Constitution establishes that seats in the Chamber of Deputies would be allocated proportionally to district population, the 1976-1983 military government introduced amendments that bolstered representation of the peripheral region in that body.28 These amendments added three additional deputies to each province beyond those allotted on the base of population, and established that no province would be represented by less that 5 deputies. As a result, the degree of malapportionment has been increased.

This institutional overrepresentation, (...) meant that no national winning electoral or legislative coalition could be put together without the support of the regional structures of power in the periphery.